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We investigate stock market rationality by examining the timeliness and unbiasedness of the 
market’s response to dividend announcements. Our initial findings for market timeliness show a 
sluggish market reaction to dividend announcements; however, when the ex-dividend effect is 
controlled for, we find no evidence of a sluggish market reaction. We examine the unbiasedness of 
the market’s response by testing whether the net announcement effect across a sample that is 
devoid of ex-post selection bias sums to zero. We observe a significant positive net announcement 
effect and examine several plausible conjectures for this puzzling phenomenon, but none provides a 
satisfactory explanation. 
1. Introduction 
Much of the empirical research in finance is concerned with identifying the 
relation between stock returns and economic events. Meaningful interpretation 
of these ‘event studies’ presupposes the efficiency of the stock market. If prices 
do not react quickly and unbiasedly to new information, little economic insight 
can be gained from observing stock returns around the announcement of 
various financial or economic events. Although the efficient market hypothesis 
is a cornerstone of finance, increasingly researchers have documented apparent 
instances of market inefficiencies [e.g. Joy, Litzenberger and McEnally (1977) 
Charest (1978), Copeland and Mayers (1982), and Rendleman, Jones and 
Latane (1982)]. The market’s reaction to dividend announcements is an im- 
portant example. If the market does not react efficiently to the announcement 
of regular, well anticipated events, like dividend announcements, it would be 
*We would like to thank J. Brickley, M. Jensen (the editor), M. Miller, and especially P. Asquith 
(the referee) for their helpful comments. This research was supported by summer research grants 
from the University of Michigan Graduate School of Business Administration. 
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difficult to interpret the market’s reaction to less frequent and less predictable 
events. 
Two recent studies have examined the stock market’s reaction to dividend 
announcements and report evidence of market inefficiency.’ Charest (1978) 
finds that the market’s response to dividend announcements is sluggish: shares 
earn abnormally high returns subsequent to announcements of dividend in- 
creases and abnormally low returns subsequent to decreases, suggesting a 
trading profit opportunity. Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) test the market’s 
ability to form unbiased expectations by examining whether the net announce- 
ment effect across all dividend announcements sums to zero. In contrast to the 
implication of market rationality (i.e., efficiency) the authors find evidence of a 
positive net announcement effect. 
We re-examine both the timeliness and unbiasedness of the market’s re- 
sponse to dividend announcements and compare our results to those of 
Charest and Kalay and Loewenstein. Using a larger sample we document a 
result similar to Charest’s for dividend increases, but find no evidence of a 
sluggish market response to dividend decreases. To explain the result for 
dividend increases, we note that dividend announcements are followed by 
ex-dividend days and that Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) document significant 
positive abnormal returns preceding ex-dividend days. We find that the posi- 
tive abnormal returns prior to the ex-day, the ex-dividend period effect, 
account for the sluggish market reaction to the announcement of dividend 
increases. When the ex-dividend period effect is controlled for, the market 
appears to react in a timely fashion to the announcement of dividends. 
Kalay and Loewenstein note a survivorship bias in their sampling procedure. 
They attempt to document the extent of this bias by examining several 
sub-samples; however, it appears that these sub-samples still contain an 
ex-post selection bias and this may be responsible for the observed positive net 
announcement effect. To avoid the introduction of any ex-post selection bias, 
we develop a sampling procedure that only relies upon ex-ante information. 
Even with such a sample, we still find a positive net dividend announcement 
effect. 
In an attempt to explain the positive net dividend announcement effect, we 
explore several plausible conjectures: the confounding of the ex-dividend 
period effect with the announcement effect, changes in beta risk during the 
announcement period, and possible sampling problems. Like the timeliness 
tests, we find that part of the positive net announcement effect can be traced to 
the ex-dividend period effect; but even after controlling for the ex-dividend 
‘Other studies that have examined the reaction of stock prices to dividend announcements 
include Pettit (1972,1976) Watts (1973,1976a, 1976b). Laub (1976). Aharony and Swary (1980) 
Eades (1982), Asquith and Mullins (1983), and Brickley (1983). For the most part, these studies 
have either concluded or assumed that the market’s reaction to dividend announcements is 
efficient. 
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period, we still observe a significant positive announcement effect. Following 
Kalay and Loewenstein, we attempt to relate this result to increases in risk 
during the announcement period. Using a nonlinear seemingly unrelated 
regression model that allows for a scaling of beta during the announcement 
period, we find no evidence that betas increase around dividend announce- 
ments. We also consider several possible sampling problems; however, none 
provides a satisfactory explanation. 
In the next section we present the basic methodology. Section 3 examines the 
timeliness of the market’s response to dividend announcements and section 4 
tests for the unbiasedness of the market’s reaction. We examine several 
possible explanations for the positive net dividend announcement effect in 
sections 5, 6 and 7. The final section contains concluding remarks. 
2. Methodology 
To measure the market’s reaction to dividend announcements, we form an 
equally weighted portfolio of all securities that make a regular dividend 
announcement on each trading day. Because the composition of these an- 
nouncement day portfolios changes over time, we compute standardized excess 
returns (SER) for the portfolios as 
SER,, = (RP,k -RP,)/& 
where t is the announcement day (date of portfolio formation), k is the 
number of trading days relative to f (k = - 10 to + lo), RP,, is the portfolio 
return on relative day k, RP, is the estimated mean return, and & is the 
estimated standard deviation of the return on the portfolio formed on day t. 
In estimating RP, and c?, we note that the nature of dividend announce- 
ments is often anticipated (leaked) before the announcement date; therefore, 
there is a tendency for abnormally high returns to occur prior to the announce- 
ment of dividend increases and abnormally low returns prior to the announce- 
ment of decreases. If the mean return is estimated with preannouncement 
returns, the estimate (RP,) will be biased upward for dividend increases and 
downward for dividend decreases. To avoid this problem, we estimate the 
mean portfolio return and standard deviation with post-announcement day 
returns. Rational expectations fully utilize all available information, and hence, 
expectational errors are independent over time. Thus, the returns following a 
dividend announcement are independent of the nature of the announcement. 
However, in using these returns we need to consider the potential impact of the 
ex-dividend period. Eades, Hess and Kim document that on average common 
stocks earn an abnormal return that totals about 0.33% during an eleven-day 
period centered on the ex-dividend day. During the first six days of this period 
(beginning five days before the ex-day and ending on the ex-day) the total 
584 K. Eades et al., EfJiency and dividend announcemenls 
abnormal return is 0.57%.2 To reduce the impact of the ex-dividend period 
effect on our estimate of the average portfolio return, we estimate the mean 
portfolio return and standard deviation during the thirty-day period beginning 
thirty-one days after the announcement and ending sixty days thereafter. In 
our sample, only 6.5% of the dividend announcements have ex-dividend days 
more than thirty days after the announcement; thus, the bias contained in our 
estimate of the average portfolio return should be trivial.3 
Assuming that security returns are independently and identically distributed 
and multivariate normal, each of the standardized excess returns (SER) of (1) 
has a univariate Student t distribution with twenty-nine degrees of freedom 
and a standard deviation of one .4 The asymptotic distribution of the average 
SER is normal with a standard deviation equal to the square root of the 
inverse of the number of observations T- ‘I2 Conditional on the null hypothe- . 
sis of no announcement effect, the mean of the asymptotic distribution is zero. 
3. The timeliness of the market’s response to dividend announcements 
3.1. The sample 
In testing the timeliness of the market’s response, our basic sample consists 
of all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) common stocks that made ‘regular’ 
dividend announcements during the period 2 July 1962 to 31 December 1980. 
We define a regular dividend as any distribution that is coded by the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly master file as an ordinary cash 
dividend paid quarterly. Each regular dividend announcement is compared to 
the previous regular dividend and is then classified as an increase, a decrease, 
or a no-change in dividends. Of the total 73,597 regular dividend announce- 
ments during the sample period, there are 13,107 increases, 1,993 decreases, 
and 58,497 no changes.5 
3.2. Results 
Average portfolio returns are calculated for the twenty-one-trading-day 
period centered on the announcement day. We also calculate the average 
* Eades, Hess and Kim use a mean adjusted excess return that is essentially identical to that used 
here. 
3 The ex-dividend period effect averages 0.33% and this occurs for 6.5% of the firms in our 
sample. This bias (6.5% x 0.33%) is spread over the thirty-day estimation period, and thus implies 
a bias in the estimated mean return of only 0.0007% (6.5% x 0.33% X l/30). 
4This ignores a trivial prediction error adjustment of (1 + l/30)‘/* [see Zellner (1971, p. 30)]. 
‘If the CRSP files contain no announcement date for a regular dividend, or if no other regular 
dividend precedes the announcement during the previous quarter, the observation is excluded from 
this sample. Because initiations of dividends have no preceding regular dividends and zero 
dividends are not included in the CRSP data, our sampling procedure excludes these observations. 
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portfolio market adjusted excess returns (returns less an equally-weighted 
market index of NYSE stocks), the average portfolio mean adjusted excess 
returns (returns less RP,), and the average portfolio standardized excess 
returns of (1) for the same twenty-one-trading-day period. Table 1 reports 
these results along with t-statistics relative to zero for the average SER and a 
two-tailed significance level. 6 The results for the increase sample are shown in 
panel A, decreases in panel B, and the no changes in panel C. Each of the 
samples exhibits a significant announcement effect. As might be expected, the 
increase announcements are good news, and the decreases are bad news. 
However, the positive announcement effect for the no-change sample is some- 
what surprising. The overwhelming frequency of no-change announcements 
(58,497 out of 73,597 observations) and the tendency for dividends to increase 
over time would seem to suggest that the market would view a no-change 
announcement as either no news or bad news. 
The post-announcement day returns for the dividend increase sample are 
significantly positive for six days after the announcement day. The large 
positive SER on the day after the announcement can be explained by the fact 
that some dividend announcements are made after the close of trading. 
However, the returns on days +2 through +6 are anomalous and are 
consistent with Charest’s finding that the market is slow in reacting to dividend 
announcements. 
In contrast to the dividend increase sample, the post-announcement day 
returns for the dividend decrease sample are consistent with a timely market 
reaction. Panel B shows that virtually all of the adjustment in share prices 
occurs on the announcement day and the day following the announcement. 
This result is not consistent with Charest’s findings. For dividend decreases, 
Charest reports that the market adjusted excess returns cumulate to - 1.01% 
over the period of days +2 through +6.7 Over the same period, we observe a 
cumulative market adjusted excess return of only - 0.129%. 
Charest finds the largest abnormal returns for the twenty-one-day period 
from day + 32 through day + 52 (the second month following the announce- 
ment month). During that twenty-one-day period Charest reports market 
adjusted excess returns that cumulate to 1.55% for dividend increases and to 
-3.15% for dividend decreases. In contrast, when we calculate the market 
adjusted excess returns over the same twenty-one-day period, our increase 
sample cumulates to -0.19% and our decreases, to -0.25%. These striking 
differences are apparently due to the small sample used in Charest’s study: 
Charest’s sample includes only 177 dividend increases and 49 dividend de- 
creases as opposed to the 13,107 increases and 1,993 decreases of our sample. 
6To examine the sensitivity of our results to the assumption of normality, we use the Wilcoxon 
rank sum statistic to verify all of our results. Because the parametric and the non-parametric test 
results imply identical conclusions, we only report the parametric test results. 
‘Charest’s measure of market adjusted excess returns is identical to ours 
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Table 1 
Test of timeliness of market’s reaction to dividend announcements. Average percentage daily raw 
returns, market adjusted excess returns, mean adjusted excess returns, and standardized excess 
returns (SER) of equally weighted announcement day (AD) portfolios of all NYSE common 




Average adjusted adjusted Average 
t-statistic 
Average for average 
relative to raw excess excess standardized SER- SER 
announcement return retumd returnee excess standard relative 
day (8) (Q (W return’ deviation to zero 
-10 0.042 -0.024 - 
- 9 0.107 0.037 
- 8 0.080 0.015 
- 7 0.086 0.020 
- 6 0.101 0.038 
- 5 0.074 0.015 
- 4 0.091 0.027 
- 3 0.152 0.084 
- 2 0.112 0.056 
- 1 0.180 0.128 
AD 0.628 0.579 
+ 1 0.438 0.388 
+ 2 0.226 0.173 
+ 3 0.139 0.091 
+4 0.114 0.064 
+ 5 0.093 0.036 
+ 6 0.101 0.031 
+ 7 0.095 0.034 
+ 8 0.078 0.026 
+9 0.015 - 0.048 
+10 0.078 0.006 
Panel A : Increases in regular dividendsa 
0.016 - 0.0036 1.132 
0.049 0.0395 1.140 
0.022 0.0200 1.112 
0.028 0.0217 1.155 
0.043 0.0421 1.114 
0.016 0.0273 1.135 
0.033 0.0472 1.163 
0.094 0.0822 1.164 
0.054 0.0482 1.139 
0.123 0.0961 1.158 
0.571 0.5327 1.398 
0.380 0.3762 1.341 
0.168 0.1504 1.200 
0.081 0.0780 1.331 
0.056 0.0532 1.163 
0.036 0.0457 1.174 
0.043 0.0433 1.095 
0.037 0.0340 1.150 
0.020 0.0141 1.127 
0.042 - 0.0274 1.113 

































Panel B: Decreases in regular diuldendsb 
-10 0.024 - 0.063 - 0.031 0.0034 1.130 0.107 
-9 0.041 - 0.064 - 0.015 0.0057 1.237 0.165 
- 8 0.070 0.015 0.015 0.0249 1.116 0.801 
- 7 - 0.028 - 0.088 - 0.084 - 0.0128 1.111 ~ 0.415 
- 6 0.000 - 0.049 - 0.055 - 0.0251 1.115 - 0.809 
- 5 - 0.015 - 0.059 - 0.071 0.0016 1.169 0.050 
-4 - 0.024 - 0.090 - 0.080 - 0.0074 1.194 - 0.224 
- 3 0.031 - 0.025 - 0.025 0.0076 1.194 0.229 
-2 - 0.060 - 0.095 - 0.115 - 0.0121 1.210 - 0.358 
- 1 - 0.033 - 0.076 - 0.088 -0.0112 1.146 ~ 0.352 
AD - 1.138 - 1.204 - 1.194 - 0.6456 2.140 - 10.835 
+ 1 - 0.782 - 0.853 - 0.837 - 0.4378 2.008 - 7.830 
+ 2 0.050 - 0.033 - 0.005 0.0409 1.358 1.081 
+ 3 0.094 0.009 0.039 0.0390 1.258 1.113 
+4 0.044 - 0.040 - 0.011 0.0303 1.302 0.836 
+ 5 0.008 - 0.053 - 0.047 - 0.0140 1.192 - 0.422 
+ 6 0.073 - 0.013 0.018 0.0300 1.136 0.950 
+ 7 0.161 0.086 0.105 0.0712 1.123 2.276 
+ 8 - 0.075 -0.145 -0.130 - 0.0220 1.178 ~ 0.670 
+ 9 0.085 - 0.001 0.030 0.0586 1.202 1.751 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Test of timeliness of market’s reaction to dividend announcements. Average percentage daily raw 
returns, market adjusted excess returns, mean adjusted excess returns, and standardized excess 
returns (SER) of equally weighted announcement day (AD) portfolios of ah NYSE common 




Average adiusted adjusted Average 
t-statistic 





raw excess excess standardized SER- 
return retumd returnee excess standard 














Purrel C: No change in regular dividendsC 
0.056 - 0.003 0.007 0.0023 1.190 
0.051 ~ 0.007 0.002 0.0078 1.153 
0.043 - 0.017 - 0.006 - 0.0063 1.157 
0.052 - 0.007 0.003 0.0012 1.161 
0.071 0.012 0.023 0.0045 1.186 
0.041 - 0.012 ~ 0.002 - 0.0095 1.165 
0.039 - 0.020 - 0.010 - 0.0114 1.151 
0.053 - 0.005 0.005 ~ 0.0127 1.166 
0.062 0.005 0.014 - 0.0033 1.180 
0.069 0.013 0.020 0.0135 1.173 
0.129 0.8975 
0.455 0.6491 
- 0.364 0.7159 
0.067 0.9462 
0.253 0.8002 
- 0.550 0.5823 
- 0.665 0.5062 
- 0.731 0.4645 
- 0.186 0.8522 
0.771 0.4410 
AD 0.104 0.047 0.055 0.0609 1.221 3.351 
+ 1 0.116 0.058 0.067 0.0746 1.214 4.127 
+ 2 0.092 0.035 0.043 0.0448 1.189 2.529 
+ 3 0.109 0.054 0.060 0.0644 1.181 3.660 
+4 0.078 0.026 0.029 0.0353 1.147 2.064 
+ 5 0.072 0.018 0.023 0.0237 1.150 1.385 
+ 6 0.060 0.004 0.012 0.0041 1.142 0.241 
+ I 0.051 ~ 0.006 0.003 - 0.0040 1.140 - 0.238 
+ 8 0.031 - 0.025 - 0.017 ~ 0.0181 1.153 - 1.056 
+ 9 0.049 - 0.007 O.ooO 0.0136 1.154 0.789 














aThe number of announcement day portfolios is 3,774 with an average of 3.47 stocks per 
portfolio for a total of 13,107 announcements. The average portfolio estimated mean (RP,) is 
0.058 percent and the average portfolio estimated standard deviation (3) is 1.293 percent. 
bThe number of announcement day portfolios is 1,290 with an average of 1.55 stocks per 
portfolio for a total of 1,993 announcements. The average portfolio estimated mean (p,) is 0.055 
percent and the average portfolio estimated standard deviation (4) is 1.895 percent. 
‘The number of announcement day portfolios is 4,511 with an average of 13.0 stocks per 
portfolio for a total of 58,497 announcements. The average portfolio estimated mean (RP,) is 
0.049 percent and the average portfolio estimated standard deviation (4) is 0.886 percent. 
dMarket adjusted excess returns equal the difference between the announcement day portfolio 
returns and the returns on an equally-weighted marked index of NYSE stocks. 
‘Mean adjusted excess returns equal the difference between the announcement day portfolio 
returns and RP,. 
‘Standardized excess returns equal the mean adjusted excess returns for the announcement day 
portfolio divided by the standard deviation where m, and 4 are estimated during the thirty-day 
period of + 31 to +60. 
J.F.E F 
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3.3. Controlling for the ex-dividend period 
Although the small sample size in Charest’s study explains much of his 
anomalous results, our results still show a sluggish market reaction to the 
announcements of dividend increases and no-changes: the SER’s in panel A 
are significantly positive on days + 2 through + 6, and in panel C on days + 2 
through +4. To explain these results we note that in constructing our sample 
no attempt was made to control for the occurrence of ex-dividend days. As 
previously noted, returns on stocks exhibit particularly large positive excess 
returns prior to and on their ex-dividend days. Thus, when ex-dividend days 
are in close proximity to announcement days, the returns between the an- 
nouncement day and the ex-dividend day will be abnormally high. When firms 
make favorable dividend announcements, these abnormally high post- 
announcement day returns could give the appearance of a sluggish positive 
market reaction. 
To avoid confounding announcement and ex-dividend effects, we add the 
sampling constraint that no ex-days (for the announced dividend or any other 
distribution) occur during the twenty-one-day period beginning five days 
before the announcement and ending fifteen days thereafter. Table 2 reports 
the results for dividend increases, decreases, and no-change announcements 
when this requirement is imposed on our sample. The sampling constraint 
reduces the sample to 18,984 regular dividend announcements, 3,392 increases, 
419 decreases, and 15,173 no changes. In contrast to table 1, the SER’s in 
table 2 indicate a timely response to dividend announcements. For increases, 
the only significant SER after day + 1 occurs on day +2. The no-change 
sample in panel C shows a marked decrease in SER’s: the SER’s on the 
announcement day and the following days are no longer significant. Ap- 
parently, the market interprets the announcement of a no-change in dividends 
as no news. These results suggest that the market reacts rapidly to dividend 
announcements, and that the observed sluggish reaction can be traced to the 
confounding of announcement and ex-dividend effects. 
4. Test for unbiasedness in the market’s response 
Our investigation of market rationality focuses on two implications of the 
hypothesis: the timeliness of the market’s response to dividend announcement 
and its unbiasedness. After controlling for the ex-dividend effect, we have 
documented a timely market response, * ’ however, we have yet to show whether 
this timely response is also unbiased. 
“Using the ex-dividend effect to explain the sluggish market response does not by itself imply 
that the market is efficient. Such a conclusion would require that the ex-dividend effect is not the 
result of a market inefficiency. 
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Table 2 
Test of timeliness of market’s reaction to dividend announcements: controlling for ex-dividend 
period. Average percentage daily raw returns, market adjusted excess returns, mean adjusted 
excess returns, and standardized excess returns (SIX) of equally weighted announcement day 
(AD) portfolios of all NYSE common stocks in the period July 2,1962 to December 31.1980. 
Average Average 
market mean f-statistic 
Days Average adjusted adjusted Average Average for average 
relative to raw excess excess standardized SER SER 
announcement return retumd return’ excess standard relative Significance 
day (%) (%I (%I return’ deviation to zero - level 











- 0.025 - 0.0048 1.122 - 0.191 
- 0.009 0.0089 1.142 0.350 
0.002 - 0.0034 1.123 -0.135 
0.046 0.0308 1.250 1.104 
0.083 0.0577 1.173 2.201 
- 0.043 - 0.0026 1.200 - 0.098 
0.064 0.0641 1.147 2.501 
0.041 0.0488 1.194 1.829 
0.018 0.0185 1.199 0.689 
0.092 0.0862 1.143 3.375 
AD 
+ 1 
0.043 - 0.047 
0.058 - 0.024 
0.069 - 0.014 
0.114 0.031 
0.151 0.084 














- 0.009 - 0.061 
0.065 ~ 0.012 
0.588 0.4484 1.477 13.579 






















0.091 0.0959 1.197 3.584 0.0003 
0.010 0.0382 1.458 1.173 0.2408 
- 0.014 0.0046 1.148 0.180 0.8570 
0.013 0.0375 1.077 1.557 0.1196 
0.006 0.0058 1.087 0.238 0.8116 
0.058 0.0477 1.173 1.819 0.0691 
- 0.047 -0.0311 1.141 - 1.221 0.2222 
- 0.076 - 0.0290 1.118 ~ 1.161 0.2456 
~ 0.003 0.0037 1.078 0.155 0.8768 
Panel B: Decreases in regulur dividends’ 
-10 0.000 - 0.064 - 0.081 
- 9 0.206 0.075 0.125 
- 8 0.000 -0.100 - 0.081 
- 7 0.033 ~ 0.062 ~ 0.048 
- 6 - 0.012 -0.111 ~ 0.094 
- 5 0.027 - 0.058 - 0.054 
-4 0.097 ~ 0.074 0.015 
-3 0.125 ~ 0.022 0.044 
- 2 - 0.067 - 0.177 ~ 0.149 
- 1 0.011 - 0.124 ~ 0.071 
AD - 0.950 - 1.065 ~ 1.032 
- 0.0157 1.222 -0.235 
0.1027 1.153 1.628 
~ 0.0339 1.132 ~ 0.547 
0.0230 1.117 0.376 
- 0.0408 1.242 ~ 0.600 
- 0.0042 1.304 - 0.059 
0.0856 1.217 1.285 
0.0537 1.340 0.732 
- 0.0324 1.313 ~ 0.451 
- 0.0722 1.062 ~ 1.243 
~ 0.4903 2.122 ~ 4.224 
- 0.3995 2.153 - 3.391 
0.0746 1.198 1.137 
0.1548 1.309 2.161 
- 0.0474 1.234 - 0.702 
- 0.0226 1.143 - 0.362 
0.0089 1.190 0.137 
0.1199 1.122 1.953 
0.0550 1.239 0.812 
0.1234 1.208 1.867 












+ 1 - 0.684 - 0.786 - 0.765 
+ 2 0.123 - 0.004 0.041 
+ 3 0.436 0.325 0.354 
+4 -0.100 ~ 0.169 -0.182 
+ 5 0.096 0.053 0.015 
+ 6 0.085 ~ 0.042 0.003 
+ 7 0.334 0.224 0.252 
+8 0.165 0.087 0.084 
+ 9 0.250 0.190 0.168 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Test of timeliness of market’s reaction to dividend announcements: controlling for ex-dividend 
period. Average percentage daily raw returns, market adjusted excess returns. mean adjusted 
excess returns, and standardized excess returns (SER) of equally weighted announcement day 
(AD) portfolios of all NYSE common stocks in the period July 2.1962 to December 31, 1980. 
Average Average 
market mean 
Days Average adjusted adjusted Average Average 
relative to raw excess excess standardized SER 
announcement return retumd returnee excess standard 
day (W) (W) (W) retumf deviation 
Punel C: No change in regular dividends’ 
-10 0.051 
-9 0.036 
- 8 0.010 
- 7 0.075 
- 6 0.104 
- 5 0.074 
-4 0.031 
- 3 - 0.000 
- 2 0.030 
- 1 0.042 
AD 0.072 
+ 1 0.063 
+ 2 0.068 
+ 3 0.075 
+ 4 0.056 
i 5 0.026 
+ 6 0.013 
+ 7 0.027 
+ 8 0.016 
+ 9 0.053 
+ 10 0.056 
-0.011 - 0.001 
~ 0.028 ~ 0.016 




~ 0.028 - 0.021 
- 0.057 - 0.053 
- 0.018 ~ 0.022 






- 0.021 - 0.026 
- 0.036 - 0.039 
- 0.017 - 0.026 
- 0.029 - 0.037 
0.005 0.000 
- 0.008 0.004 
0.0005 1.186 
0.0051 1.130 




- 0.0045 1.135 
- 0.0380 1.128 
- 0.0184 1.172 






- 0.0166 1.105 
0.0258 1.112 
~ 0.0091 1.128 
















- 0.250 0.8028 
- 2.117 0.0343 
- 0.983 0.3256 






- 0.942 0.3464 
- 1.459 0.1447 
- 0.508 0.6115 




“The number of announcement day portfolios is 2,002 with an average of 1.69 stocks per 
portfolio for a total of 3,392 announcements. The average portfolio estimated mean (RP,) is 0.067 
percent and the average portfolio estimated standard deviation (4) is 1.694 percent. 
bThe number of announcement day portfolios is 334 with an average of 1.25 stocks per portfolio 
for a total of 419 announcements. The average portfolio estimate mean (m,) is 0.082 percent and 
the average portfolio estimated standard deviation (4) is 1.924 percent. 
‘The number of announcement day portfolios is 3,93X with an average of 3.85 stocks per 
portfolio for a total of 15,173 announcements. The average portfolio estimated mean (RP,) is 
0.051 percent and the average portfolio estimated standard deviation (9) is 1.302 percent. 
d Market adjusted excess returns equal the difference between the announcement day portfolio 
returns and the returns on an equally-weighted market index of NYSE stocks. 
‘Mean adjusted excess returns equal the difference between the announcement day portfolio 
returns and RP,. 
‘Standardized excess returns equal the mean adjusted excess returns for the announcement day 
portfolio divided by the standard deviation where RP, and 6, are estimated during the thirty-day 
period of +31 to +60. 
Table 3 
















not available on 
CRSP master file 
4. I. The sample 
Our tests for 
require a sample 
an unbiased market response to dividend announcements 
that is devoid of any ex-post selection bias. In constructing 
such a sample it is useful to consider the possible sequences of regular dividend 
payments that could occur over two consecutive quarters. A firm can either pay 
or not pay a dividend in a quarter. If the firm paid a regular dividend last 
quarter, in the current quarter it can either declare a continuance of positive 
dividends or an omission of dividends. Similarly, if the firm paid no dividend 
last quarter, in the current quarter it can either declare an ‘initial’ dividend or 
it can declare a non-resumption of dividends. These four possible sequences of 
regular dividends are depicted in table 3. 
One way of avoiding any ex-post selection bias is to construct a sample that 
includes all types of dividend announcements shown in table 3. To construct 
such a sample would require that an announcement date be identified for every 
dividend decision. As table 3 shows, the announcement dates for continuances 
and initial payments are available on the CRSP master file, but the dates for 
initial omissions and non-resumptions are not. Hence, the dates for initial 
omissions and non-resumptions must be collected from other sources. How- 
ever, it is rare for firms that are not paying dividends to make public 
announcement concerning their decision not to reinstitute dividends; conse- 
quently, the announcement dates of non-resumptions are often nonexistent. 
The unavailability of the announcement dates for non-resumption of di- 
vidends precludes conducting our tests for unbiasedness with all the types of 
distributions in table 3. Fortunately, a test of market rationality or efficiency 
does not require such a sample. Unlike non-resumptions, initial omissions are 
virtually always reported in the Wall Street Journal Index or Standard and 
Poor’s Annual Dividend Record. Thus, we can test for unbiased expectations by 
conditioning on the fact that firms paid positive dividends in the previous 
quarter. Rationality implies that expectations are unbiased conditional upon 
all prior information. If we condition on the payment of dividends in the 
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previous quarter, the sample only includes continuances and initial omissions 
in the current quarter (see table 3) and the net announcement effect for this 
sample should be zero. 
It might seem that tests for unbiasedness of the market’s response to 
dividend announcements requires a sample devoid of other simultaneous 
announcements, notably earnings announcements, so that the sample includes 
only ‘clean’ dividend announcements. However, a rational or efficient market 
forms unbiased expectations for all types of announcements, and hence, the 
inclusion of simultaneous announcements introduces no bias. Indeed, selecting 
a sample of clean dividend announcements requires an ex-post selection rule 
and there is no reason to believe that such a sample is unbiased. 
From the CRSP files, we identify 73,783 cases of continuances of regular 
dividends.’ We define an initial omission of dividends to have occurred any 
time a firm announces its intention to ‘omit’, ‘defer’, or ‘take no action’ on a 
regular dividend. During our sample period of 1962 through 1980, we docu- 
ment 367 announcement dates of dividend omissions. of which 317 are 
collected from Standard and Poor ‘s Annual Dividend Record and the remaining 
50 are collected from the Wall Street Journal Index. Whenever available, the 
announcement date from Standard and Poor’s is used; otherwise, we use the 
trading day immediately preceding the Wall Street Journal’s publication date. 
4.2. Results 
Table 4 reports our basic results. Given the nature of our sample we have 
only two types of announcements: initial omissions and continuances of 
dividends. The average returns for each of these announcement types are 
reported in the first two columns of table 4. Not surprisingly, initial omissions 
result in a large price decline: on the day of announcement and the day 
following share prices fall by about 7.6%. The announcement of dividend 
continuances produces less dramatic results: stock prices increase by a total of 
about 0.3% over the announcement day and the day following the announce- 
ment. The third column of table 4 shows the average returns across both types 
of announcements, and these returns are virtually identical to the returns for 
the announcements of continuances. Even though announcements of initial 
omissions are bad news, the infrequency of these announcements causes them 
to be swamped by the mildly good news of dividend continuances. 
‘The sample of continuances includes 73,783 announcements whereas the sample of increases, 
decreases and no changes used to test for timeliness includes only 73,597 dividend announcements. 
The additional 186 announcements in the continuances sample are cases when regular dividends 
are followed by non-regular dividends instead of regular dividends. In these instances, we use the 
non-regular dividend announcement dates in our test, These non-regular dividends include extra 
and special dividends, stock dividends and stock splits, share repurchases, as well as other types of 
distributions. None of the results for the unbiasedness tests are significantly affected when these 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































594 K. Eades et al., Ejiciency and dioidend announcements 
The remaining columns of table 4 report the results for average excess 
returns across both types of announcements. As one might infer from the 
average raw returns reported in the first three columns, the aggregated average 
announcement effect is positive. The excess returns on the day of the announ- 
cement and the day after are significant in excess of the 0.0001 level. Taken at 
face value, these results suggest that the market is either overly pessimistic in 
forecasting dividends or overly optimistic in assessing the information content 
of dividend announcements. 
Kalay and Loewenstein document a two-day standardized daily mean excess 
return of 0.167 as opposed to our two-day SER of 0.245. Although Kalay and 
Loewenstein’s sample only include 20,451 dividend announcements and ours 
includes 74,150, such a difference in announcement effects would appear to be 
significant. However, Kalay and Loewenstein’s standardized daily mean excess 
returns are computed differently from our SER’s. Kalay and Loewenstein 
calculate standardized excess returns for each security in their sample and then 
average these in event time to arrive at their standardized daily mean excess 
returns. In contrast, we calculate standardized excess returns for portfolios that 
include all stocks that announce a dividend on a particular trading day. 
Because of the diversification effect, the portfolio standard deviations are less 
than the average standard deviations of the securities included in the portfolio, 
and hence, our average SER’s are larger than their standardized daily mean 
excess returns. More important, Kalay and Loewenstein’s procedure does not 
account for the cross-sectional dependencies in security returns and hence it is 
difficult to draw statistical inference from their results. In contrast, our 
procedure explicitly accounts for the cross-sectional dependencies. 
4.2.1. Controlling for the ex-dividend period 
Our test for timeliness of the market’s response to dividend announcements 
revealed that the ex-dividend period was confounding the measurement of 
announcement effects. After controlling for the ex-dividend period, we found 
no evidence of a lagged marked response to dividend announcements. The 
ex-dividend period may also be confounding the results reported in table 4. If 
ex-dividend days and announcement days are in close proximity, announce- 
ment day returns could reflect these positive abnormal returns during the 
ex-dividend period. 
To avoid confounding the ex-dividend period effect with the announcement 
effect, we again require that no ex-days (for the announced dividend or any 
other distributions) occur during the twenty-one-day period beginning five 
days before the announcement day and ending fifteen days after the announce- 
ment. This sample selection procedure reduces our total sample of dividend 
continuances from 73,783 to 19,016. 
Because omissions have no ex-days associated with them, the sampling 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































598 K. Eades et al., Eficiency and dividend nnnouncements 
tinuances would be systematically underrepresented relative to omits. To avoid 
over-representing omit announcements, the current quarter’s sample excludes 
all omit announcements for securities that had ex-days falling within the 
twenty-one-day period in the previous quarter. If there is a constant lag 
between dividend announcement days and ex-days, applying this rule to the 
previous quarter is equivalent to applying it to the current quarter. Our omit 
sample was reduced from 367 to 111. 
The results of controlling for the ex-dividend period are reported in table 5. 
The aggregate sample shows that controlling for the ex-dividend period re- 
duces the returns after day + 1; none of the excess returns from day + 2 
through + 10 are significant at conventional levels. However, the two-day 
announcement period (days 0 and + 1) excess returns are still significantly 
positive: the announcement day excess return is significant in excess of the 
0.0001 level and the day after at about the 0.02 level. These results suggest that 
the market’s expectations of dividends are biased and conflict with market 
rationality. 
To determine if the results in table 5 are specific to a particular sample 
period, we report the results for five sub-periods in table 6. Four of the five 
sub-periods exhibit positive announcement day SER’s and three of these are 
significant at the 0.01 level and beyond. The second sub-period of June 21, 
1966 through July 20; 1970 exhibits a negative announcement effect but it is 
not significant. These results suggest that the positive announcement effect for 
the total period is not driven by an isolated abnormal period. 
5. Changes in risk 
Kalay and Loewenstein argue that because dividend announcements convey 
important information about firms’ values, the risk of firms’ shares increases 
around dividend announcement dates; in turn, the increase in risk implies an 
increase in expected returns, If true, Kalay and Loewenstein’s reasoning may 
explain our results; indeed, Kalay and Loewenstein find that betas increase by 
an average of nine percent around dividend announcement dates for their 
sample. Such an effect seems to be present in our tables 4 and 5 in that the 
average standard deviation of the standardized excess returns are higher on the 
announcement day and the day after. However, table 5 also shows an average 
daily raw return of 0.10% during the two-day announcement period; about 
twice the estimation period average daily return of 0.054%. To explain dif- 
ferences in average returns of this magnitude with changes in risk in the 
context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) requires that betas 
increase by more than one hundredpercent during the announcement period.” 
“According to the CAPM, if announcement period expected rates of return are twice as large as 
the estimation period expected rates of return, the announcement period betas, /I,, must be related 
to the estimation perjod betas, /I,, as follows: /3, = R,/( R, - R,) + 2fi,, where F, is the riskfree 
rate of interest and R, is the expected rate of return on the market portfolio. 
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Table I 








Test of hypothesis 
coefficient that y, = yz = = y3,) 
(y*=yl= =y30) 
Sample period 
July 2.1962 through 
February 7.1967 
February 8.1967 through 
October 21.1971 
October 25,197l through 
May 27,1976 
May 27,1976 through 




- 0.037 - 0.033 21.48 0.8411 
(0.047) 
0.089 0.069 25.65 0.6441 
(0.045) 
0.028 0.007 31.54 0.3404 
(0.035) 
0.071 0.050 47.96 0.0148 
(0.037) 
“The model is 
ii,,=a,+p,ii,,,+B,y,(S,,~,,)+cY:6,,+~,,, i=1,2 ,..., N, t=1,2 ,..., T, 
where R,, = return on day I for security i, R,,, = CRSP value-weighted index for day 1, a,, = 1 in the 
period [I - 1, t + l] when security I announces a regular dividend on day t, and 0 otherwise. and 
y, = risk scaling factor for security i in the announcement period. 
‘Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
‘The &i-squared statistic has 29 degrees of freedom. 
To formally investigate the effect of risk changes on our results, we propose 
the following model: 
k, = a, + Plk, + P,Y,wL) + co8, +e’,,, i= 1,2 t = I,2::::: T, N, (2) 
where Ri, is the return of security i on day t, k,,,, is the return of the CRSP 
value-weighted index on day t, ai, takes on a value of one if security i 
announces a dividend during the three-day period of t - 1 through t + 1 and 
zero otherwise, and Z,, is a random disturbance. The coefficient yi allows for 
changes in risk via a scaling of beta (p,) and the (Y: controls for announcement 
effects or beta-related shifts in the intercept ( LY,) of (2). If betas increase around 
dividend announcement dates, we would expect the scaling coefficients (y,) to 
be positive. 
We use the securities included in the Dow Jones 30 to estimate the 
parameters of (2). Although this is a limited sample, it should provide some 
insight into the reasonableness of the hypothesis.” For purposes cL presenta- 
“Although not reported here, our test for unbiasedness on the Dow Jones 30 yielded no 
significant difference from the results reported in table 4. 
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tion, we also estimate a version that restricts the scaling coefficients to be equal 
across the securities included in the Dow. We use a Gauss-Newton procedure 
to estimate (2) and assume that the vector of disturbances (e) is normally, 
independently and identically distributed with a mean vector of zeroes and an 
unrestricted covariance matrix. With these assumptions the Gauss-Newton 
procedure is approximately maximum likelihood.‘* 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating (2) for four sample periods each of 
1,160 trading days. For each of these periods we report the average unre- 
stricted estimate of the scaling coefficient (7) the restricted estimates of the 
scaling coefficients (y*) along with their standard errors, the &i-squared 
statistic associated with the restriction that the scaling coefficients are the same 
across the securities included in the Dow (the likelihood ratio test), and the 
p-value for the hypothesis of equality of the scaling coefficients (the probability 
of observing the sample conditional upon the hypothesis of equality). If betas 
do not change during the announcement period, the true scaling coefficient is 
zero; in this case, we should accept the hypothesis of a common scaling 
coefficient (y*) and the estimated coefficient should be small relative to its 
standard error. In all but the last period, we accept the hypothesis of a 
common scaling of beta, and the estimates of the common coefficients are 
small relative to their standard errors. In sum, our results are consistent with 
unchanging betas.13 
6. Sampling problems 
6.1. Missing omission announcement dates 
During the period July 2, 1962 to December 31, 1980 there are 398 regular 
dividend payments by NYSE common stocks that are not followed by a 
distribution in the subsequent quarter. Of this total, we document 367 an- 
nouncement dates for initial omissions; leaving thirty-one possible announce- 
ments of initial omissions with no announcement dates. Four of the thirty-one 
result from a change in the frequency of payment (e.g. quarterly to semi- 
annual); seven are isolated payments not preceded by regular payments; 
however, twenty appear to be bona fide omit candidates. We gauge the 
potential effect of these missing dates by calibrating the number of missing 
omit announcements required to exactly offset the observed announcement 
“See Judge, Griffith, Hill and Lee (1980, pp. 735-736). 
i3This result conflicts with the conclusion reached by Kalay and Loewenstein. For each firm in 
their sample, Kalay and Lowenstein estimate an announcement period beta and a non-announce- 
ment period beta. The average of these betas is 0.86 for the announcement period and 0.79 for the 
non-announcement period. Although it is unclear how the authors test for differences in these 
average betas, they report a ‘c-statistic’ of 2.33. Interestingly, the nine percent increase in their 
betas during the announcement period is not dramatically different from the average estimate of 
our risk scaling coefficient (7) in table 7. 
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effect. To make this calculation, we assume that the two-day excess announce- 
ment returns in table 5 represent the appropriate announcement effect. 
The average excess returns during the two-day announcement period (days 0 
and + 1) for the aggregated sample in table 5 sum to 0.09% (0.076% + 0.016%) 
and the average two-day announcement return for the initial omissions is 
about - 7.6% (- 4.11% - 3.45%). Assuming that the average return of - 7.6% 
is entirely excess return, and using the total number of announcements in our 
complete sample (table 4), the number of missing omissions that is required to 
yield a zero announcement effect is (73,783 + 367) X 0.09%/7.6% = 878; far 
more than twenty. 
6.2. A survivorship bias 
In calculating the standardized excess returns we estimate portfolio mean 
returns and standard deviations with returns thirty-one to sixty days after the 
dividend announcement date. Because of this estimation procedure, securities 
are only included in our sample if they are listed for at least sixty days after the 
dividend announcement. This listing requirement imparts a survivorship bias 
to our sample. If firms that experience financial distress are likely to delist and 
if these firms are also likely to make disappointing dividend announcements, 
the sixty-day listing requirement will impart a positive bias to our results. 
A total of 367 dividend announcements are excluded from our sample 
because the securities delisted prior to sixty days after the announcement. The 
vast majority of the delistings (326) preceded mergers: 322 of these are regular 
dividends and four are initial omits. The remaining forty-one announcements 
are delisted for reasons other than a merger: thirty-five of these are regular 
divends and six are initial omits. Given that most of the delistings are due to 
mergers, it seems unlikely that the excluded securities experienced negative 
announcement effects and that their exclusion imparts a positive bias to our 
results. Indeed, the average two-day announcement period returns of the 
excluded announcements is 0.554% as opposed to 0.292% for the two-day 
announcement period returns in table 4. If the sixty-day listing requirement 
has imparted any bias to our announcement day returns, it has caused us to 
understate, not overstate, the two-day announcement effect. 
6.3. Non-trading and multiple-day returns around dividend announcements 
If dividend announcements convey new information and the arrival of new 
information results in higher trading volume, securities will be traded more 
frequently around dividend announcements. For securities that are not traded 
frequently, this means that there will be a higher frequency of multiple-day 
returns around dividend announcements, imparting a positive bias to the 
average returns during the announcement period. An obvious way of investi- 
gating the influence of multiple-day returns is to examine the behavior of a 
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sample of heavily traded securities. Because larger firms tend to be traded more 
frequently than smaller firms, we repeat the test for both the Dow Jones 30 and 
the firms that have market values in the top decile of NYSE common stocks. 
Although these results are not reported here, they are virtually identical to 
those reported in table 4. 
7. The timing of dividend announcements 
Dividend announcement dates are under the control of firms’ management 
and are not known with certainty to investors. The discretionary nature of 
dividend announcement dates raises the possibility that the timing of announ- 
cements conveys information to the market. Such an argument could be used 
to explain our results if favorable dividend announcements are generally 
announced early. If such a pattern existed, a rational market would interpret 
the failure to announce early as a signal that the impending dividend announ- 
cement is not ‘good news’. As a consequence, the common stocks of firms not 
announcing early would experience price reductions. In other words, the 
unfavorable announcements are anticipated and hence are not fully reflected 
during the announcement period (days 0 and + 1) imparting a positive bias to 
the measured effect for the total sample. This explanation implies that there is 
a tendency for negative excess returns to precede the non-early announce- 
ments, which, in turn, implies that the average pre-announcement excess 
returns across all announcements will be negative. 
To test the predictions of this conjecture we need to develop a test for the 
significance of the cumulated pre-announcement day average SER’s. Such a 
test is complicated by the dependency structure imphcit in the average SER’s: 
the averages for different days in event time include returns from the same 
calendar days. With positive contemporaneous correlation of security returns, 
averaging SER’s in event time induces a positive correlation among the 
averages. However, we can devise an approximate test by assuming that the 
average SER’s are jointly independent. The true correlation among the aver- 
ages is positive and hence the significance level of the approximate test will be 
overstated. 
In table 5 we have 4,119 portfolios implying an approximate standard 
deviation of 0.0156 (l/&ll9) for each of the average SER’s. Assuming 
independence of the average SER’s, the approximate standard error of a 
ten-day sum is 0.0493 (0.0156 x m). In table 5 for the ten-day period prior to 
the announcement, the average SER’s cumulate to 0.028. Given the approxi- 
mate standard error of 0.0493, this sum is insignificantly different from zero. 
Although not reported, the thirty-day pre-announcement period for this sam- 
ple is also insignificant: the average SER’s cumulate to -0.004 and the 
standard error is 0.0853 (0.0156 X m). These SER’s suggest that the timing 
of the dividend announcements is unlikely to explain the positive net dividend 
announcement effect. 
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An an alternative approach to testing the influence of announcement timing, 
we use expected rather than actual announcement dates in the tests for 
unbiasedness. Because the expected dates are estimated independent of the 
current quarter’s actual announcement date, the use of expected dates avoids 
the timing problem. We estimate each quarter’s expected announcement date 
as a naive projection of last year’s actual announcement date. For example, if a 
firm announced its fourth quarter dividend on the third Wednesday of Novem- 
ber in 1982, the expected announcement date for the fourth quarter of 1983 
would also be the third Wednesday of November. The results of using this 
naive expectations model for the announcement dates are similar to the results 
reported in tables 4 and 5: the SER's for the announcement period, days 0 and 
+ 1, are significantly positive both before and after controlling for the ex- 
dividend period. l4 With these results, or lack thereof, it is difficult to conclude 
that the timing of dividend announcement explains the positive announcement 
effect. 
8. Conclusions 
Our investigation has focused on two aspects of the market’s response to 
dividend announcements: the timeliness and the unbiasedness. Like the earlier 
study by Charest, we find a lag in the market’s response to dividend announce- 
ments. A closer examination reveals that this lag is due to the confounding of 
ex-dividend effects with announcement effects. When we control for the 
ex-dividend effect, there is no evidence of a lag in the market’s response to 
dividend announcements. 
In contrast to the results for the timeliness tests, the tests for unbiased 
expectations of the market with respect to dividend announcements yield 
results that conflict with market rationality. Although our sample of dividend 
announcements was constructed to avoid any ex-post selection bias, the 
average excess returns on the announcement day and the day following the 
announcement are positive and highly significant, suggesting that the market is 
either overly pessimistic in forecasting dividends or overly optimistic in assess- 
ing the informational content of dividend announcements. Following Kalay 
and Loewenstein, we attempt to relate this result to changes in risk during the 
announcement period. However, our formal test shows no evidence of signifi- 
cant increases in beta risk during the announcement period. We also consider 
several potential sampling problems: missing data, a survivorship bias, non- 
trading, and the discretionary nature of dividend announcement dates. Taken 
one at a time, these potential explanations are incapable of explaining the 
observed phenomenon. Although they may be able to explain it if considered 
I4 Kalay and Loewenstein use an identical expectations model for their sample of 302 large firms 
and also report significantly pobitive excess returns for the announcement period. 
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jointly, we are unaware of any test that would allow us to test for their effects 
simultaneously. 
Ignoring the joint effect of the potential explanations, an obvious interpre- 
tation of the results is that the market’s reaction to dividend announcements is 
positively biased: a violation of market rationality. To reach such a conclusion, 
we must consider the magnitude of the observed deviation. Although the 
abnormal returns during the two-day announcement period of 0.09% is statisti- 
cally significant, the arbitrage profit opportunity is too small to cover the 
trading costs of even those investors with the lowest transaction costs. None- 
theless, our results imply a mispricing in the stock market and a portfolio 
trader (an investor who intends to trade for portfolio reasons and therefore 
faces zero marginal transaction costs) can profit by timing trades. Assuming 
that the average security has four dividend announcement days in a year, the 
average announcement effect implies an annual excess return of about 0.36%. 
In light of the fact that the average annual return of the securities included in 
our sample was about 14%, it is difficult to judge if the observed deviation of 
0.36% is economically significant or within the bounds of reasonableness. 
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